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Abstract—Deep Learning is emerging as an effective technique
to detect sophisticated cyber-attacks targeting Industrial Control
Systems (ICSs). The conventional approach to detection in litera-
ture is to learn the “normal” behaviour of the system, to be then
able to label noteworthy deviations from it as anomalies. How-
ever, during operations, ICSs inevitably and continuously evolve
their behaviour, due to e.g., replacement of devices, workflow
modifications, or other reasons. As a consequence, the accuracy
of the anomaly detection process may be dramatically affected
with a considerable amount of false alarms being generated. This
paper presents DAICS, a novel deep learning framework with
a modular design to fit in large ICSs. The key component of the
framework is a 2-branch neural network that learns the changes
in the ICS behaviour with a small number of data samples and a
few gradient updates. This is supported by an automatic tuning
mechanism of the detection threshold that takes into account
the changes in the prediction error under normal operating
conditions. In this regard, no specialised human intervention is
needed to update the other parameters of the system. DAICS
has been evaluated using publicly available datasets and shows
an increased detection rate and accuracy compared to state of
the art approaches, as well as higher robustness to additive noise.
Index Terms—Anomaly detection, Domain shift, Deep Learn-
ing, Industrial control networks
I. INTRODUCTION
Nefarious cyber-attacks targeting Industrial Control Systems
(ICSs) may cause service downtime or material losses in
industrial production sites, with potential negative repercussions
on the lives of citizens. A notable example is the blackout
attack against the Ukrainian power grid perpetrated in late
2015 [1], which exploited the BlackEnergy (BE) malware.
In that occasion, the attackers intruded remotely into the
computers of three regional power distribution companies in
a coordinated manner. They executed a malicious code to
alter the firmware of specific control devices and to instruct
unscheduled disconnections from servers. The attack affected
thousands of users and left them without electricity. Another
example is the attack the Iranian nuclear program [2] in 2010
by means of the Stuxnet work. The worm infected the code
running inside the Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs),
collecting information on the ICS and damaging the centrifuges
inside the plant by repeatedly changing their rotation speed.
The increasing occurrence of such attacks and their com-
plexity have motivated the development of intrusion detection
solutions for ICSs based on machine learning techniques.
Among the different approaches proposed in the scientific
literature, a popular and powerful technique is the one-class
classification. At the training stage, solutions based on one-class
classification build a model that represents the normal behaviour
of the ICS (the class of “normality”). At the production stage,
the detection system uses that model to verify whether the
behaviour of the live system matches the expected normal
behaviour. Deviations from the normality, usually determined
through thresholds on the classification error, are flagged as
anomalies.
These algorithms can be very sensitive to abnormal be-
haviours, including zero-days anomalies or attacks and faulty
devices or sensors, since they may evade the detection process.
Moreover, real-world ICSs are dynamic and operate in noisy
environments: these factors may hamper the correct functioning
of the detection system because they can “shift” the normal
behaviour. In such scenarios, the main challenges are to (i)
timely update the model of normality upon changes in the
production workflows, and (ii) periodically refresh the detection
thresholds. Previous works either do not tackle such challenges
[3], [4] or require highly-specialised human intervention to
update the parameters of the model [5], [6].
This paper tackles the aforementioned challenges by propos-
ing DAICS (Deep learning Anomaly detection in Industrial
Control Systems), an anomaly detection solution for ICSs based
on the one-class classification paradigm. DAICS combines a
database-oriented management approach and a deep learning
architecture to model the normal behaviour of the ICS. The
proposed neural network relies on wide and deep learning
and convolutional layers to memorise and generalise the
characteristics of the ICS. Wide and deep learning is a technique
that has been recently proposed to improve the performance
of recommender systems [7]. Convolutional layers, introduced
by Yann LeCun in 1990 [8], apply small filters to detect
patterns in the input while requiring a limited number of
trainable parameters. Convolutional layers, and Convolutional
Neural Networks in general, have become very popular in
many application areas, including network security [9]–[11]
and anomaly detection in ICSs [12]–[14].
As anticipated above, a common issue of one-class classi-
fication mechanisms is the high false alarm rate caused by
the progressive evolution of the normal behaviour of the ICS
with respect to the initial one, based on which the model was
trained. This phenomena, called domain shift, can be caused
by changes in the industrial workflow, degradation of devices
and communication links over the time, installation/removal
of devices, updates in the devices’ firmware or configuration,
or to external noise on the communication channels. DAICS
implements an automatic threshold tuning algorithm and the
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2so-called few-time-steps algorithm, the latter based on the few-
shot learning paradigm [15], [16], to quickly update the model
with the latest changes of the ICS normal behaviour.
We evaluate DAICS using datasets collected from the Secure
Water Treatment (SWaT) and Water Distribution (WADI)
testbeds, which are widely used for security research in ICSs
[17]. The datasets comprise a training set containing only
normal records, and a test set with normal and anomalous
records. The anomalies in the test sets are real-world attacks
targeting the integrity and the availability of the testbeds [18].
DAICS has been compared with state-of-the-art solutions in
terms of anomaly detection accuracy and robustness to Gaussian
noise.
The contributions of this work can be summarised as follows:
• An Anomaly Detection System (ADS) that has a modular
architecture to fit large ICSs. The key components of the
proposed ADS is a 2-branch neural network, in which
a wide branch is designed to memorise the existing
relations between the input features, while a deep branch
generalises the model to unknown relations.
• An automatic threshold tuning technique that dynamically
tunes the detection threshold based on the prediction error
observed on the live ICS.
• A sensitivity analysis of hyperparameters of the proposed
ADS using two real-world datasets, namely, the SWaT and
WADI. The analysis provides practical insights to improve
the performance under different operating conditions.
DAICS extends our previous work called AADS (Adaptive
Anomaly Detection in industrial control Systems) [19]. With
respect to AADS, DAICS scales better to larger ICSs, adopts
an automated threshold tuning mechanism based on deep
learning, and it has been tested on two public datasets:
SWaT (like AADS) and WADI. The comparison presented
in this paper shows that DAICS improves AADS in terms
of precision (fewer false positives) and robustness to additive
noise on the SWaT dataset.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows: Section II
reviews state-of-the-art works on anomaly detection in ICSs.
Section III defines the threat model used in this research.
We describe the SWaT and WADI datasets in Section IV.
The problem statement is provided in section V. Section
VI introduces the proposed anomaly detection framework.
Experimental setup and the evaluation results are presented in
section VII. We conclude this paper in section VIII.
II. RELATED WORK
This section reviews recent research studies on anomaly
detection in ICSs. Particular attention is given to those works
focusing on water treatment plants and validated using the
SWaT and WADI datasets, as their performance is discussed
in Section VII for state-of-the-art comparison.
In [5], Goh et al. present an approach based on a Recurrent
Neural Network (RNN) and the Cumulative Sum (CuSum)
technique to detect the anomalies. CuSum sets upper and lower
control limits for the prediction error in each sensor and actuator.
An anomaly is detected when the prediction error is outside
such limits. Besides suffering from a high false-positive rate,
the main limitation of this approach is that it might require
an expert human intervention to tune and update the CuSum
limits.
Kravchik et al. [20] propose a solution for detecting
anomalies using convolutional and recurrent neural networks.
The key aspect of this work is a statistical approach for anomaly
detection based a normalised value of the prediction error. The
normalisation is computed by using the mean and standard
deviation of the prediction error of the benign samples recorded
during normal operations of the water treatment plant, as
recorded in the SWaT dataset. However, the authors do not
explain how such statistical properties are updated in the case
of changes in the production environment, quite frequent in real-
world environments, as discussed in Section I. An extension of
this work can be found at [4], in which the authors present their
preliminary results (the paper has not been peer-reviewed at
the time of writing) on SWaT, WADI and BATADAL datasets.
In addition to the 1D-Convolutional Neural Network (CNN)
proposed in the first paper, the authors explore the performance
of two more models such as Undercomplete Auto-encoder
(UAE) and windowed-Principle Component Analysis (PCA).
We compare the performance of DAICS and these works in
Section VII.
The approach presented in [21] is based on computing the
distance between current and previous devices states. It is
assumed that the distance should stay below a threshold during
normal operations. The proposed solution has been tested only
on the SWaT dataset, where it shows similar performance to
DAICS in terms of F1 score, as discussed in Section VII-C.
However, the number of detected attacks is not shown in the
paper, hence preventing a full understanding of the effectiveness
of the approach.
The anomaly detection solution proposed in [6] is based
on an Multilayer Perceptron (MLP) and relies on a threshold
applied to a weighted sum of the prediction errors of all sensors
and actuators. Low weights are assigned to those devices whose
normal behaviours are hard to predict. This strategy, adopted
to increase the performance on the SWaT dataset, shows a
high rate of false negatives, which leads to a low number of
detected attacks, as shown in Section VII.
TABOR [3] is an anomaly detection solution validated on the
SWaT dataset. TABOR combines two different models, namely:
Probabilistic Deterministic Finite Automaton (PDFA), and a
Bayesian Network (BN). The final anomaly detection is based
on a combination of results from the two models. Also in this
case, the authors do not address the problem of updating the
model in case of changes in the normal operations of the ICS.
Updating the model here appears significantly cumbersome
due to the complex characterisation of the interaction between
sensors and actuators needed to build the model.
In general, ADSs rely on a threshold that acts as the
maximum allowed prediction error during normal operations,
above which a systems state is considered anomalous. The
threshold is either selected empirically by an expert [20] or
based on the prediction error on the training set [6], [21]. In
this paper, we propose a technique for automated threshold
tuning, which dynamically adjusts the threshold on test time,
improving the ability of DAICS to adapt to the normal
3behaviour evolution. In [22], [23], Markov chains and support
vector regression are employed to dynamically tune thresholds
for anomaly detection in network traffic (e.g., port scans,
brute force attacks, SQL injections, etc.) and robot-assisted
feeding. To the best of our knowledge, DAICS is the first
anomaly detection solution for water treatment plants (and
ICSs in general) to implement an automated threshold tuning
mechanism.
In summary, a common drawback of available solutions is
that they are not flexible enough to quickly and efficiently
adapt to changes in the production environment. In a water
treatment plant, examples of such changes are: increasing
the size of a water tank or replacing a motorised valve with
another with different operation modes. Instead, our approach is
based on a novel algorithm called few-time-steps, presented in
Section VI-E, that fine-tunes the neural network according
to the changes in the normal behaviour of the ICS. The
proposed algorithm uses a small amount of data to update
the weights of the neural network and requires minimal human
intervention. This is supported by an automated threshold
tuning technique, which adds to DAICS ability to cope with
the dynamic behaviour of industrial environments. Moreover,
the proposed neural network architecture is designed to be
scalable, so it can model the normal behaviour of large ICSs.
III. THREAT MODEL
We assume that attacker’s capabilities include gaining remote
access to the networked control system, to the Supervisory
Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) workstation, or can
physically compromise sensors and actuators within the ICS.
We also assume that the attacker has domain knowledge
of the targeted ICS, e.g., the physical property measured
by each sensor and the physical consequences of actuation
commands. The attacker’s goal is to use the above capabilities
and knowledge to damage or modify the ICS operations. This
includes: (i) altering the state of actuators through a MITM-
like attack, in which the actuator receives commands from
the attacker instead of a PLC, (ii) sending spoofed sensors
readings to the PLC to drive the PLC to take wrong decisions,
and (iii) tampering with the PLC firmware aimed to take the
ICS out of service or to change the programmed logic (e.g.,
the Stuxnet worm [2]).
IV. DATASETS
We evaluate DAICS using two popular public real-world
datasets, namely Secure Water Treatment (SWaT) and Water
Distribution (WADI). In this section we provide a short
introduction to the main properties of the two dataset, also
summarised in Table I.
TABLE I: Properties of the SWaT and WADI datasets.
Dataset Records Duration(days) Attacks Sensors Actuators
SWaT 946,722 11 36 25 26
WADI 1,209,610 16 15 69 54
A. The SWaT dataset
This dataset has been collected from the SWaT testbed, a
reduced version of an operational clean water treatment plant
[17], [24]. The water treatment process is monitored by a
SCADA workstation and is divided into six sub-processes,
including raw water supply and storage, ultra-filtration and
backwash. The sub-processes are controlled by a pair of
PLCs that communicate with sensors (water flow indication
transmitters, level indicator transmitters, analyser indicator
transmitters, such as pH analysers, and ultra-violet modules)
and actuators (e.g., pumps, motorised valves). The PLCs collect
the readings from the sensors that monitor the status of the
physical process, and send actuation commands to the actuators.
Based on the PLC’s internal logic, such commands may be
used to either change or keep the current state of an actuator.
The dataset consists of 946,722 records of sensors and
actuators collected during 11 days of operation at a rate of
one sample per second. Each record contains 51 attributes,
representing 25 sensors readings and 26 actuators states. The
dataset is divided into a 7-day portion of normal operations,
which has been used as the training set, plus a 4-day portion
of normal activity combined with 36 attacks generated by
following the attack model in [18] (the test set). 20% of the
training set is used for validation (validation set).
The attacks in the test set are of duration ranging between two
minutes and nine hours, and involve one or multiple devices at
the same time. Attacks include spoofing the readings of sensors
or reversing the operation states of actuators. For instance, in
the first attack, the state of a motorised valve is switched
from closed to open for 15 minutes aiming to cause a tank
overflow. In another attack, the value reported by a water level
sensor is decreased by 0.5mm/sec for seven minutes, again
with the intention of causing a tank overflow. A more detailed
description of these attacks is available in [24], [25].
B. The WADI dataset
The WADI testbed is a reduced version of a real-world
water distribution network [17], [26]. The testbed network
consists of three sub-processes, or stages, including a primary
grid for water supply, a secondary grid for water distribution
to six consumer tanks, and a return-water grid that handles
the excess of water from the consumer tanks. Similarly to
the SWaT testbed, also WADI is supervised by a SCADA
workstation. Moreover, each sub-process is controlled by a PLC
communicating with sensors and actuators. Sensors include
water flow indication transmitters, level indicator transmitters,
analyser indicator transmitters and pressure meters. Like the
SWaT testbed, actuators include pumps and motorised valves.
The WADI dataset comprises 1,209,610 records, each with
123 attributes divided into 69 sensors readings and 54 actuators
states collected during a period of 16 days. Normal operation
conditions have been recorded during the first 14 days, split
into training (95%) and validation (5%) sets. The last two days,
with normal activity and 15 attacks, are used as test set. The
attacks follow the same model used in the SWaT dataset and
described in [18], although with shorter duration (between 2
and 30 minutes). For instance, one attack cuts off the water
4supply to consumer tanks; another one aims at increasing the
level of chemicals in the water by turning off a sensor and
sending false readings to the PLC for ten minutes. More details
and examples on the WADI attacks can be found in [26].
V. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Unsupervised anomaly detection solutions for ICSs are usu-
ally built using the so-called one-class classification technique.
The basic idea is to build a model of the normal behaviour
of the industrial process and to consider as anomalous every
event that does not fit the model. The main challenge with such
approaches is dealing with the domain shift, which originates
from a gap in the data distribution between the training and
unseen data [27], [28]. The tangible effect of the domain shift is
an increase of false alarms generated by the anomaly detection
system due to normal events classified as anomalies.
The domain shift problem is present in the SWaT dataset,
where we can observe changes in the normal behaviour of some
devices across the training and test sets. For instance, during
the normal operation, the pump P102 has a single state of value
1 in the training set, then it takes an additional “normal” state
of value 2 in the test set. Also, the probability distribution of
some sensors changes between the two sets. For example, in the
training set the output of the Analyser Indication Transmitter
AIT201 ranges in interval [251, 272] µS/cm (micro Siemens
per centimetre), while in the test set it ranges in [168, 267]
µS/cm with a substantial different distribution, as illustrated
in Figure 1. Another non-trivial and representative example
is the presence of redundant devices, such as the redundant
pump P102 in the SWaT testbed. A redundant pump is always
off until the primary pump stops working unexpectedly. In this
case, the PLC turns on the redundant pump instantaneously
to take over the work of the primary pump. If such a process
is not covered in the training set, the forecasting model will
consider the operations of the redundant pump as anomalies.
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Figure 1: The probability density function for sensor AIT201.
It shows the variation in the normal behaviour between training
and test sets.
The domain shift problem can be also observed in the WADI
dataset. For instance, the records of one of the Flow Indication
Transmitters range within [0, 2.3] m3/hour of water in the
training set, while the range changes to [0, 3.3] m3/hour in
the test set.
The characterisation of the normal behavioural evolvement
is still a challenge for the implementation of the anomaly
detection solutions in real-world systems [29], [30]. Current
TABLE II: Glossary of symbols.
WDNN Wide and Deep Neural Network
TTNN Threshold Tuning Neural Network
Win Input time window
Wout Output time window
Wanom Anomaly waiting time
H Horizon
G Number of output section of WDNN
µout[g] Output section g of WDNN
mac Total number of actuators
mse Total number of sensors
mgse Number of sensors of output section g
MSEg,t Prediction error on section g at time t
MSEg,[a,b) List of prediction errors on section g between time a and b− 1
Tg Anomaly threshold for section g
νt Actuator states recorded at time t
research in ICSs have tackled the domain shift problem by
only focusing on adjusting the parameters of the detection
algorithms or excluding devices with domain shift from the
modelling process, as explained before in Section II. However,
we argue that tuning the detection parameters without updating
the model of normality is not sufficient to cope with dynamic
environments such as ICSs.
In the next section, we present our solution for anomaly
detection in ICSs that encompasses a lightweight technique,
called few-time-steps learning, which is inspired by the few-
shot learning paradigm [16], [31]. The few-time-steps learning
technique updates the initial model of the industrial process
throughout its evolvement in the hardware and software
configuration, hence minimising the number of false positives
caused by the domain shift phenomena.
VI. THE DAICS FRAMEWORK
DAICS defines a model of the normal behaviour of the ICS
combining a neural network with a database-like approach.
Deep learning techniques are used to characterise the continu-
ous readings of sensors, whose values are usually sampled by
a PLC very frequently, while the database memorises the states
of actuators, as commanded by the PLC. DAICS includes the
few-time-steps learning algorithm to update the model based on
the normal behavioural evolvement of the ICS. The detection of
anomalies is determined with a threshold that is automatically
adjusted using the prediction error.
A. Prediction of sensor states
The normal behaviour of sensors is modelled using a deep
learning architecture called Wide and Deep Neural Network
(WDNN). The architecture of WDNN, shown in Fig. 2,
is inspired by the recommender system introduced in [7],
where the authors trained a wide and deep neural network
to recommend apps based on the user’s query and preferences.
Our neural network has two goals: memorization through
the wide branch and generalization through the deep branch.
Memorization means learning the relationship between feature-
pairs in the training set, hence recording the co-occurrence
of combinations of sensors values. Generalization means the
ability to explore relationships that do not exist in the training
set.
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Figure 2: Architecture of WDNN. The prediction of the sensors states,i.e. the output features, is computed combining the
information from both sensors and actuators. Note that the size of DL7 varies according to the number of output features in
each output section.
Like in our previous work [19], the neural network comprises
a Feature extractor section that learns the relations between all
sensors and actuators during the normal operation of an ICS
and extracts the features required to predict the normal states
of sensors. Instead, the output section is split into multiple
branches to serve large-scale ICSs where the sensors are
controlled by several PLCs, usually specialised on a specific
part of the industrial process with specific behaviour and
anomaly threshold.
Architecture. The neural network takes as input an array
X of data samples collected during a time window of length
Win seconds, corresponding to Win samples, as the dataset
was collected at a sampling rate of one sample per second. The
size of X is m×Win, where m = mse +mac is the number
of features for each sample including the state of mse sensors
and mac actuators taken at time t. Please note that we use the
features from both sensors and actuators because the behaviour
of the sensors depends on their current states and the actions
taken by actuators. The output Y is the predicted readings
from sensors during a future time window Wout. The two time-
windows Win and Wout are separated by a time interval called
horizon H . This separation prevents the forecasting model
from copying the last values of the input time window Win
into Wout, as pointed out by the authors of [6].
As shown in Fig. 2, the neural network architecture comprises
two convolutional layers and seven fully connected layers. The
fully connected layer DL1 defines the so-called wide branch
used for the memorisation of the normal state of sensors and
actuators using cross products between the input features.
The deep branch provides the level of generalisation nec-
essary for correctly handling the events not covered in the
training set, aiming to minimise the prediction error in the
case of new input states. The deep branch is formed with
a sequence of one fully connected layer (DL2), two one-
dimensional convolutional layers (CL1 and CL2) each one
followed by a max-pooling layer (MP1 and MP2), and finally an
additional fully connected layer (DL3). Layer DL2 transforms
the input size by increasing the size by a factor of three, acting
as a feature enrichment technique. As shown in other works
(e.g., [20]), one-dimensional CNNs are particularly suited for
modelling time series data. The purpose of layers CL1 and
CL2 is to model the data collected from sensors and actuators
in a specific time window. For max pooling, we down-sample
the output of each convolutional layer by a factor of 2. The
final fully connected layer DL3 re-shapes the output of the
deep branch to allow its concatenation with the output of the
wide branch.
Both branches are aggregated in another fully connected
layer (DL4) followed by multiple dense output sections, each
one consisting of the three fully connected layers DL5, DL6 and
DL7. Each output section learns the most relevant information
from the aggregation layer in order to predict the normal
behaviour of a group of sensors controlled by a specific PLC.
Each fully connected layer can be described as Y =
LeakyReLU(WTX + b), where Y is the output, X input,
W is an array of weights the model learns during the training,
and b is the bias. We introduce non-linearity in the model
by using the leaky rectified linear activation function defined
as follows: LeakyReLU(x) = max(0, x) + 0.01 ∗min(0, x).
Similarly, the convolutional layers can be described as Yi =
LeakyReLU(Conv(X,Wi,bi)), where Yi is the output of
the convolution on the input X using the i-th filter with weights
Wi and bias bi.
Cost function. The neural network presented above has
been trained to minimise the Mean Square Error (MSE) cost
function by iteratively updating all the weights and biases
contained within the feature extractor and all output sections.
The cost function computes the error between the prediction
of the model and the corresponding observed sensor values.
Hence, minimising the cost, we reduce the prediction error.
At the training stage, the cost function for a batch size of s
samples (i.e., s different time windows) in a specific output
6section g can be formally written as:
cg =
1
s
s∑
t=1
( 1
mgse
mgse∑
i=1
(Yt[i]− Y˜t[i])2
)
(1)
where Yt[i] is the predicted value for sensor i at sample t
(i.e. time-step t), while Y˜t[i] is the corresponding observed
sensor value (the value present in the training set). mgse is the
number of sensors in an output section g. The final cost c is the
sum of costs of all G output sections c =
∑G
g=1 cg . This cost
is minimised by using the optimisation algorithm Stochastic
Gradient Descend (SGD) [32].
B. Anomaly detection in actuators
Actuators in the SWaT and WADI testbeds include pumps
and motorised valves. The pumps are arranged in pairs of
primary and redundant hot-standby pumps. A redundant pump
is turned on only in the case the respective primary pump
stops working. This operational mode complicates building a
forecasting model that predicts the actuator states, as some
actuators (such as the redundant pumps), are rarely used during
the normal operations. As a consequence, after measuring a
high prediction error with Deep Learning (DL)-based methods
due to lack of normal operation records, we designed a light
and straightforward approach based on querying a database
containing all the normal actuator states. The database entries
are n-tuples, where n is the number of actuators in the testbed
(n = 26 in the SWaT, n = 54 in the WADI). Each entry is a
combination of actuators states labelled as normal, for a total
of 146 entries available in the SWaT dataset and 2001 entries
in the WADI dataset. An example of tuple from the SWaT
testbed is provided in Table III.
TABLE III: Tuple in the database of actuators normal states.
Actuator MV101 P101 P102 ... P601 P602 P603
Tuple 2 2 1 ... 1 1 1
At testing time, the combinations in the test set with no
occurrences in the training set are marked as anomalies, as
explained in Section VI-C.
C. Detection logic
DAICS operates on batches of actuators and sensors values
retrieved from the PLCs at regular time intervals of duration
s seconds. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that s also
corresponds to the number of readings in one batch for each
device (like in the two datasets used in the experiments). We
therefore define I = [t¯, t¯+ s) the time interval under analysis
(where [a, b) indicates the interval between a and b−1). Given
the observation time t ∈ I , DAICS verifies whether the current
combination of actuator values is present in the database A
built at the training stage. An anomaly is reported otherwise.
In the case of the sensors, the values observed at time t
are compared against those predicted by WDNN using past
values of sensors and actuators, as previously explained in
Section VI-A. More precisely, the values observed at time
t ∈ I are compared with the first element of the output of
time
t0
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sensors+actuators pred
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TTNN
t
I
I
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Figure 3: Detection process on section g of sensors through
WDNN and adaptive thresholds.
WDNN obtained from values of sensors and actuators collected
in the time window [t′, t′+Win) (one input sample for WDNN),
where t′ = t − H −Win. The MSE value of each WDNN
output section is evaluated against an adaptive threshold to
determine the presence of any anomalies.
The detection process on one single output section g of the
neural network is summarised in Figure 3, which also depicts
an adaptive threshold mechanism for automatically tuning the
anomaly threshold based on observed noise conditions on the
sensors readings. Such a mechanism is described in Section
VI-D. The region of the timeline highlighted in light blue
represents the time interval I described above.
More precisely, the samples observed on the group g of
sensors at time t are identified as anomalous when the anomaly
condition MSEg,t > Tg is met, where Tg is a threshold on the
prediction error for the group of sensors g. Using the same
notations as for the cost function in Equation 1, we define
MSEg,t as follows:
MSEg,t =
1
mgse
mgse∑
i=1
(Yt[i]− Y˜t[i])2 (2)
To reduce the false positives caused by sudden changes in
the underlying physical process (as also reported in [20]),
DAICS only reports an anomaly at time t on the sensors
if the anomaly condition has been also previously observed
for Wanom consecutive sampling intervals. In Figure 3, this
process is represented through increasing the counter cntg .
In summary, the anomaly condition can be expressed as in
the following Equation 3.
Lt =

1, if ∃g ∈ [1, G] s.t.
MSEg,i > Tg ∀ i ∈ [t−Wanom, t]
1, if νt 6∈ A
0, otherwise
(3)
7where νt is the combination of the actuators values observed
at time t, while Lt = 1 defines the anomaly condition at time
t. Wanom is one of the hyper-parameters used to tune DAICS,
as reported in Section VII.
D. Threshold Tuning
The industrial environments are usually subject to various
sources of noise. In particular, the electromagnetic noise
can interfere with the communication within the ICS, hence
compromising the operations of anomaly detection systems [33],
[34]. The main challenge is finding the correct threshold needed
to classify an event either as anomaly or as normal activity.
Previous works tackled this problem empirically, by tuning
the threshold at test time as a hyper-parameter [5], [6], [20].
While this technique produces good results in the laboratory
when using static datasets such as SWaT and WADI, online
systems can hardly afford long threshold tuning sessions for
updating the thresholds upon new noise levels. Instead, here
we propose an adaptive technique that dynamically tunes the
threshold based on the prediction error observed previously.
CL1+MP1 CL2+MP2 CL
Input
Win
OutputTTNN
Wout
Figure 4: Architecture of TTNN. Only the first element of the
output is kept. The size of the 1-dim kernel of CL1 and CL2
is 2 with stride 1.
Ali et al. [22] used a machine learning technique to estimate
the threshold based on the historical prediction error of their
ADS. In this paper, we treat the prediction error MSE as an
univariate time series that is modelled using a neural network
that we called TTNN, whose architecture is depicted in Figure
4. We use G instances of TTNN, one for each output section of
the WDNN model, to tune the thresholds Tg, g ∈ [1, G]. Each
instance is trained with the prediction error MSEg measured
on a single output section g on the validation set, which only
contains benign records, as the training set. The trained model
is used in the online system to compute the optimal anomaly
threshold Tg using past prediction errors. As represented in
Figure 3, the threshold Tg used for anomaly detection on
sensors values collected in time interval [t¯, t¯+ s) is obtained
using past prediction errors computed in time interval [t0, t0 +
s+Win), where t0 = t¯−H −Win.
As shown in Figure 4, TTNN consists of two 1-dimensional
convolutional layers, each followed by a max pooling layer,
and of one final fully connected classification layer, represented
in the figure as CL1, MP1, CL2, MP2 and DL respectively.
The input is a time series of prediction errors measured for the
samples collected in past time window of length Win seconds,
the output contributes to the estimation of the optimal anomaly
threshold for the current sensors states. A detailed description
of the threshold tuning process is described in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Threshold tuning algorithm
Input: Batch of past prediction errors on section g
(Eg = {MSEg,[t0,t0+Win),...,MSEg,[t0+s,t0+Win+s)}),
where t0 = t¯−H −Win
Output: Anomaly threshold for WDNN output section g (Tg)
1: Test = []; . List of estimated thresholds
2: TTNN[g]← load the weights and biases for section g;
3: E¯g ← median(Eg) . Median filter on the input
4: for X = ¯MSEg,[t0+i,t0+Win+i) ∈ E¯g s.t. i ∈ [0, s) do
5: Yˆ = TTNN[g](X); . Estimated prediction error
6: Test.append(Yˆ [0]);
7: end for
8: Tg = Tbase +max(Test);
Referring to the timeline depicted in Figure 3, the anomaly
threshold used at time t ∈ [t¯, t¯ + s) for output section
g is computed by using a batch Eg of s samples de-
fined as time series of past prediction errors of length
Win, starting from MSEg,[t0,t0+Win), MSEg,[t0+1,t0+Win+1),
to MSEg,[t0+s,t0+Win+s).
At line 3 in of the algorithm, a median filter is applied to the
input batch of past prediction errors Eg to reduce the impact
of short-term changes of the prediction error on the threshold
tuning process. Median filtering is accomplished by sliding
a window over Eg while computing the median value of the
elements of Eg under the window. The resulting median values
are stored in array E¯g . One variable to consider in this process
is the size of the median filter. In this regard, we experimented
with values between 50 and 120. As reported in Table IV,
we obtained the best results with median filter size of 59. In
the loop at lines 4-7, the algorithm computes the estimated
prediction error using the median values in E¯g. As shown at
line 6, only the first element of the output layer is memorised
for further processing.
The threshold Tg is computed at line 8 as the maximum
of the predicted thresholds plus the offset Tbase. Tbase is set
as the sum of the mean plus the standard deviation of the
prediction error on the validation set, and is kept constant after
the deployment. This offset is added to reduce the sensitivity
of the WDNN to small variations on sensors values, hence
reducing the false positives.
As a final step, the algorithm executes one SGD epoch to
update weights and biases of each of the G instances of TTNN
using the respective input batch Eg .
E. The few-time-steps algorithm
The few-time-steps algorithm has been designed to efficiently
reconfigure DAICS in a production environment in the case
an anomaly is identified by the system and then recognised as
false alarm by the technician.
In such a situation, DAICS is triggered by the technician to
update the database A of actuators states and to tune the output
section of the pre-trained WDNN. The only assumption is that
the technician can recognise false alarms caused by changes
in the normal operating condition of the ICS (e.g., changes
8in the hardware/software configurations). Unlike state-of-the-
art solutions, the proposed approach only assumes a domain-
specific understanding of the ICS operations, without requiring
a deep knowledge of the algorithms and their thresholds and
hyper-parameters.
Of course, the number of human interventions needed to
handle the false alarms is an important parameter to determine
the usability of the anomaly detection system. If the system
is too sensitive, the technician would be overwhelmed by a
large number of alarms to be verified, making it hard to spot
those that are due to normal changes in the ICS behaviour,
hence false. On the contrary, a conservative approach might not
reveal true malicious activities or anomalies. Both cases can
render the system ineffective, if not unusable. The sensitivity
of DAICS to this parameter will be analysed in Section VII.
Algorithm 2 Few-time-steps learning algorithm
Input: Batch of samples (S), Technician’s input: False alarm
at time t (FAt[i]) i ∈ [0, G]
Output: Retrained output section (µout[g])
1: if νt 6∈ A and FAt[0] == True then
2: A = A ∪ νt; . Update the database of actuators
3: end if
4: EPtuning ← number of fine-tuning epochs;
5: for g ∈ [1, G] do
6: if FAt[g] == True then
7: µout[g]← weights and biases
8: for epoch in EPtuning do
9: cg ← cost of section g on S;
10: SGD(µout[g]) step to minimise cg;
11: µout[g]← update weights and biases;
12: end for
13: end if
14: end for
Algorithm 2 is called upon an technician’s decision that an
alarm detected by the system at time t is false. This means that
Algorithm 2 is called when both of the following conditions
are satisfied: the anomaly condition Lt = 1 and at least one
of the elements of the boolean vector FAt[i] (i ∈ [0, G]) is
True. FAt indicates where the false alarm has been detected,
either among the actuators (FAt[0] = True), or in one or
more groups of sensors (FAt[i] = True, i ∈ [1, G]), or both.
In the first case, with FAt[0] = True, the algorithm adds
the combination of actuator states νt to database A (lines 1-3),
as the technician has determined that νt is normal and must be
treated as such by the system. In lines 5-14, the output sections
of the neural network that have produced the false alarm are
updated. Specifically, in lines 8-12, SGD is employed to fine-
tune the output section through multiple gradient steps. We
calculate the prediction loss for the data samples aggregated in
a batch of S samples containing the false alarm (S is passed
as an input to algorithm). The optimiser minimises this loss
by tuning the parameters of the output layers DL, DL6, and
DL7. After EPtuning optimisation steps (around 400 ms on
average for 100 epochs on our testing environment described
in Section VII-A), the updated output section µout[g] replaces
the previous one in the anomaly detection process (line 11).
Note that, grouping the sensors into different sections speeds
up the execution of the few time steps algorithm, since only
a portion of the output section is updated in the case of false
alarms.
VII. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section, we present a detailed evaluation of DAICS
obtained using the SWaT and WADI datasets presented in
Section IV. The evaluation comprises a comparison with state-
of-the-art solutions in terms of detection accuracy, number of
detected attacks and robustness to noisy data.
A. Experimental Setup
DAICS has been implemented in PyTorch 1.0 [35] and
validated using a Singularity container [36] running in a shared
machine configured with 16 CPU cores, 64 GB virtual RAM
and an NVIDIA 1080Ti GPU. The database of actuators normal
states A is implemented as a NumPy array populated using the
training datasets. The maximum size of the array is less than
1MB for each of the two datasets. Prior to our experiments,
we also normalised the sensor readings between 0 and 1.
B. Methodology
As per convention in the literature, we configure and evaluate
DAICS using the following metrics:
Pr =
TP
TP + FP
Re =
TP
TP + FN
F1 = 2 · Pr ·Re
Pr +Re
where Pr=Precision, Re=Recall, F1=F1 Score, TP=True Posi-
tives, FP=False Positives, FN=False Negatives. It is important
to highlight that we adopt a point-based approach to compute
these metrics. Thus, precision, recall and F1 score are computed
using the labelled records (points) of the datasets, which report
whether a record (a combination of actuators states and sensors
readings recorded at a given time) is normal or anomalous.
Like most of related works in the literature, we adopt this
approach to tune the hyperparameters of WDNN and TTNN
models, to assess the overall performance of DAICS and for
comparison with the state-of-the-art.
We used a grid search strategy to explore the set of hyper-
parameters using F1 score as the performance metric. The final
sets of hyper-parameters that maximise the F1 score on the
two datasets are reported in Table IV.
These hyper-parameters are kept constant throughout our
experiments presented below in this section, except when we
study the sensitivity of DAICS to a specific hyper-parameter.
In our experiments, we measure the sensitivity of DAICS
to noise. It is worth recalling that industrial control systems
operate in hostile environments [37], where the communication
channels are often subject to interference (e.g., in the case
of employing wireless communication devices [38]). For
evaluation purposes we add Gaussian noise to sensor readings
of the SWaT dataset with mean µ = 0 and standard deviation
σ ∈ {1, 2, 3, 5, 10, 15}. The noise distribution and the values
of µ and σ have been selected based on similar assumptions
made in other works regarding the noise in communication
channels of networked control systems [33], [34].
9TABLE IV: Hyperparameters.
Hyperparameter SWaT WADI
Horizon (H) 50 20
Input time window (Win) 60 50
Output time window (Wout) 4 4
Anomaly time window
(Wanom)
30 30
WDNN
Hyperparameter SWaT WADI
Learning rate (α) 0.01 0.001
Batch size (s) 32 32
Tuning epochs (EPtuning) 100 100
DL1 Neurons Wout Wout
DL2 Neurons 3 ∗Win 3∗ (mse+mac)
DL3 Neurons Wout Wout
DL4 Neurons 80 80
DL5 Neurons 2.25*mgse 2.25*m
g
se
DL6 Neurons 1.5*mgse 1.5*m
g
se
DL7 Neurons mgse m
g
se
CL1 Kernels, Kernel size 64, 2 64, 5
MP1 Pooling size (64, 2) (64, 2)
CL2 Kernels, Kernel size 128, 2 128, 5
MP2 Pooling size (128, 2) (128, 2)
TTNN
Hyperparameter SWaT WADI
Learning rate (α) 0.01 0.01
Batch size (s) 32 32
Tuning epochs (EPtuning) 1 1
Median kernel size 59 59
CL1 Kernels, Kernel size 2, 2 2, 2
MP1 Pooling size (2, 2) (2, 2)
CL2 Kernels, Kernel size Wout, 2 Wout, 2
MP2 Pooling size (Wout, 2) (Wout, 2)
DL Neurons 1 1
In this research, we do not evaluate the robustness of
DAICS against adversarial noise, i.e., the noise added to the
communication channels by an attacker intending to perturb
the detection accuracy. Indeed, the defence against adversarial
attacks in ICSs is a complex problem, and its discussion is
outside the scope of this work.
The validation presented below is divided into three different
experiments. In Experiment 1 and 2, we compare the perfor-
mance of DAICS with relevant works in the state-of-the-art in
terms of precision, recall, F1 score, and the number of attacks
correctly detected. Experiment 1 evaluates DAICS using the
SWaT dataset, while experiment 2 uses the WADI dataset.
In Experiment 3, we evaluate the robustness of DAICS to
additive noise applied on the SWaT and WADI test sets. We
also compare the results with the frameworks proposed in [19],
[20] in case of the SWaT dataset.
C. Experiment 1: Detection accuracy in the SWaT
As shown in Table V, DAICS outperforms existing state-
of-the-art detection on the SWaT test set with 88.9% F1 score,
and correctly recognises 33 out of 36 attacks in the test set.
It is worth noting that DAICS also detects a higher rate of
attacks during their execution (97% against 93% of [20]), hence
allowing the operator to activate the adequate countermeasures
more promptly.
Few-time-steps algorithm. We also evaluated the contribu-
tion of the few-time-steps algorithm to the detection accuracy
TABLE V: State-of-the-art comparison (SWaT dataset). In
parenthesis, the number of attacks detected after their end.
Architecture Precision Recall F1 Detectedattacks
DAICS 0.9185 0.8616 0.8892 33(1)
AADS [19] 0.866 0.861 0.863 33(1)
MLP [6] 0.967 0.696 0.812 25
CNN [20] 0.867 0.854 0.860 31(2)
TABOR [3] 0.861 0.788 0.823 24
Windowed-PCA [4] 0.92 0.841 0.879 -
Online-ADS [21] 0.8638 0.9064 0.8846 -
of DAICS. To this aim, we repeated the experiment disabling
the algorithm. As the SWaT test set contains normal records
that are not present in the training set, the model of normal
behaviour built with the training set leads to several false
positives and, more precisely, to a low F1-score measure of
77.7% and 1251 false alarms (compared to the 645 experienced
with the algorithm enabled).
The update process is fast. Indeed, with our setup, the
execution of one cycle of the few-time-steps learning algorithm,
including the EPtuning = 100 epochs, with a batch of 32
samples takes 400 ms on average. In an online system, the
algorithm can be triggered by the operator upon identifying
a false alarm (e.g., a known unstable sensor or actuator). It
is important to stress that this is the only requirement for the
operator, unlike other solutions where an in-depth knowledge
of the underlying algorithms is necessary to update thresholds
or other parameters.
Hyper-parameters. The sensitivity of DAICS to the hyper-
parameter Wanom is presented in Figure 5. We remind that
Wanom is defined in Equation 3 as the number of consecutive
times the prediction error MSE is higher of the anomaly
threshold on the same output section of WDNN.
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Figure 5: Sensitivity of WDNN to Wanom on SWaT dataset.
Although the number of detected attacks is quite stable to
33 (except for Wanom=36), the highest F1 score (0.8892) is
measured at Wanom=30.
False alarms. DAICS relies on the feedback from the
technician to fine-tune the output sections with new information
of the normal behaviour. Of course, the rate of technician’s
interventions is a relevant metric to consider, as too frequent
false positives can undermine the usability of the system.
With the chosen settings, we measured 645 false alarms in
total on the test set of the SWaT dataset, equivalent to 6.6
human interventions/hour on average. Although this seems a
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Figure 6: Sensitivity of WDNN to Wgrace on SWaT dataset.
manageable rate of interventions, in more complex industrial
environments compared to the SWaT testbed.
One way to reduce the rate of intervention is to allow
a grace time Wgrace, through which alarms are reported to
the technician only if they last for at least Wgrace seconds.
Of course, this practice may hide short true positives, hence
preventing the detection of a certain number of anomalies.
We tested the sensitivity of DAICS to the grace time by
varying Wgrace from 1 to 20 seconds. In Figure 6 we can
observe a minimal decrease of the F1 score (0.877 with
Wgrace=20) and a consistent reduction of the technician inter-
vention rates (from 6.6/hour with no grace time, to 1.96/hour
with Wgrace=5, to 0.95/hour with Wgrace=20). Moreover, we
did not experience any variations in the number of detected
anomalies with Wgrace=5 (still 33), while with Wgrace=20 this
number decreases to 28, as somehow expected.
D. Experiment 2: Detection accuracy in the WADI
DAICS matches the state of the art results in terms of
number of attacks detected, 14 out of 15 attacks in the WADI
dataset, while it outperforms the other solutions in terms of
F1 score, as summarised in Table VI.
TABLE VI: State-of-the-art comparison (WADI dataset).
Architecture Precision Recall F1 Detectedattacks
DAICS 0.9083 0.7205 0.8036 14
MAD-GAN [39] 0.4144 0.3392 0.37 -
1D CNN [4] 0.697 0.731 0.714 14
AE [4] 0.834 0.681 0.750 14
Few-time-steps algorithm. Given the setup described in
section VII-A, DAICS takes 800 ms to fine-tune an output
section with 100 epochs and a batch of 32 samples. Like in the
case of the SWaT dataset, we demonstrate how the few-time-
steps algorithm contributes to keeping weights and biases of
WDNN up-to-date with the changes of the normal behaviour.
Indeed, when disabling the updating mechanism, the F1-score
drops to 0.5621, while the number of false alarms increases to
from 226 to 684.
Hyper-parameters. Increasing the anomaly window Wanom
determines an increase on the number of detected attacks,
as shown in Figure 7. This is mainly due to the condition
MSEg,i > Tg in Equation 3, which yields to the detection
of short attacks when Wanom is large enough. However, for
the state-of-the-art comparison reported in Table VI, we set
Wanom=30, as this value maximises the F1 score.
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Figure 7: Sensitivity of WDNN to Wanom on WADI dataset.
False alarms. With the settings listed in Table IV, DAICS
produces 226 false positives on the WADI test set, equivalent
to 5.3 human interventions per hour on average. As for the
SWaT dataset, we measured the sensitivity of DAICS to the
grace time Wgrace. The results, reported in Figure 8, show
that increasing Wgrace reduces the number of intervention to
1.95 per hour on average at Wgrace=20, although negatively
impacting on precision, recall and F1 score even at Wgrace=5.
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Figure 8: Sensitivity of WDNN to Wgrace on WADI dataset.
E. Experiment 3: robustness to additive noise
In this experiment, we measure the robustness of DAICS
to noise added to the sensors readings. In our experiments,
we add various levels synthetic noise to the sensor readings
of both SWaT and WADI datasets. As anticipated in Section
VII-B, we use white Gaussian noise with mean µ = 0 and
increasing standard deviation σ ∈ {1, 2, 3, 5, 10, 15}. We then
observe the behaviour of DAICS with respect to the number
of detected attacks and the detection accuracy measured with
the F1 score metric. We then extend the experiment 2 in [19],
where AADS and the CNN proposed in [20] are compared,
by adding the performance of DAICS on the SWaT dataset.
Figures 9a and 9b report on the performance of DAICS as
a function of the Gaussian noise level. Although the trend of
the point-based F1 score is similar on both datasets, we can
observe a higher impact of the synthetic noise on the detection
of attacks in the SWaT dataset. We recall that an attack is
determined when the conditions in Equation 3 are met. In the
case of sensors, the MSE must be above the threshold for
Wanom consecutive samples. However, the increasing number
of point-based false negatives introduced with the noise, as
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Figure 9: Performance of DAICS when adding Gaussian noise to the SWaT (a) and WADI (b) test sets.
shown in the two figures by the trend of the recall measure,
reduces the chances of finding Wanom consecutive point-based
positive samples. Of course, this affects more the detection of
short attacks, which are more frequent in the SWaT dataset.
Figure 10 shows the values of F1-score and number of
detected attacks as functions of σ. We can notice that DAICS
improves AADS in the number of detected attacks at any
level of noise, except for σ=15 while almost matching the F1
score (we measured a slight decrease of 0.015 on average for
σ > 0). This demonstrates that the new mechanism is solid
also in noisy conditions. On the contrary, the F1 score of the
state of the art CNN drops drastically (green solid curve).
This is mainly due to the statistical approach and to the
static threshold employed to detect the anomalies, empirically
selected as the value T ∈ [1.8, 3] that maximizes the F1-score.
The low values of the F1-Score for σ > 0 are due to a low
precision measure (around 0.31 on average), meaning that the
CNN classifies most of the records as anomalies, mostly false
positives. This is the reason why the 36 attacks in the SWaT
test set are almost all correctly classified (green dashed line).
However, as everything looks like an anomaly, in a real-world
deployment, the output of the CNN would be unusable.
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Figure 10: Performance when adding Gaussian noise to the
SWaT test set.
In conclusion, DAICS overcomes state-of-the-art solutions
on both SWaT and WADI datasets with respect to point-
based F1 score and number of detected attacks. In addition,
DAICS is more robust to the additive noise, hence potentially
more reliable in real-world industrial scenarios where the
electromagnetic noise and the natural degradation of the devices
might result in noisy data.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented DAICS, a framework
for anomaly detection in Industrial Control Systems (ICSs)
grounded on the one-class classification paradigm. DAICS
has been designed to mitigate two major problems affecting
similar solutions proposed in the state-of-the-art literature. The
first, called domain shift, can be observed when changes in the
normal behaviour of the ICS are not correctly handled by the
detection system. The result is often an increase in the number
of false alarms. The second problem is caused by the presence
of noisy data, either due to interference on the communication
channel within the ICS or to the ageing of devices, which
prevents the detection system from correctly segregating the
anomalies from normal operations.
We have tackled the aforementioned problems by introducing
a fast and automated mechanism for updating the ICS model
based on the detected false alarms caused by changes in
the normal behaviour. Such a mechanism, based on the so-
called few-time-steps algorithm, has been designed to be usable
in production environments. Indeed, the only assumption is
that the technician can identify the false alarms caused by
maintenance operations (hardware/software updates) or known
misbehaving devices, and to signal them to DAICS. This
sets DAICS apart from similar solutions, where an in-depth
knowledge of the underlying algorithms is necessary to update
thresholds or other parameters. The combination of the few-
time-steps algorithm with a dynamic threshold mechanism,
also proposed in this work, allows DAICS to overcome state-
of-the-art solutions in terms of number of detected attacks and
resilience to noisy data samples.
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